This is manifest, for example, in a crisis of liberal international order (Mearsheimer 2019 Ikenberry 2018 Duncombe and Dunne 2018), the upsurge of populism and ‘petty trade wars’ between the established and rising powers (Cox 2017).Ī third option, as advocated by this article, is actually to embrace complexity in full, both conceptually and practically. With the advent of a multi-order/multiplex world (Flockhart 2016 Acharya 2018) and further redistribution of wealth and resources, this option, too, proves unsustainable. Crimea Iraq Libya, or Iran more recently). China–US current relations) or, in more extreme cases, military intervention (e.g.
While there is nothing wrong with engendering ‘like-minded orders’, their expansion to date has often resided on a one-way conditional co-optation generating dependency instead of healthy competition (e.g. The premise of this logic is to export ‘rule-/value-based order’, to make the external environment behaving ‘like us’ and aligning ‘with us’, this way also hoping to extend one’s authority and also prevent importing threats (Diez 2005). The other option is to ‘go global’ and expand existing hegemonic orders, which are often seemingly legitimised on the grounds of their historical longevity, and claims to normative ‘universality’ and inter-cultural affinity (Smith 1996).
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